A large-market rational expectations equilibrium model by Vives, Xavier
 
 










































IESE Business School – University of Navarra 
Av. Pearson, 21 – 08034 Barcelona, Spain. Phone: (+34) 93 253 42 00 Fax: (+34) 93 253 43 43 
Camino del Cerro del Águila, 3 (Ctra. de Castilla, km 5,180) – 28023 Madrid, Spain. Phone: (+34) 91 357 08 09 Fax: (+34) 91 357 29 13 
 
Copyright © 2011 IESE Business School. 
Working Paper 
WP-924 
May, 2011  
 



























The Public-Private Sector Research Center is a Research Center based at IESE Business 
School. Its mission is to develop research that analyses the relationships between the 
private and public sectors primarily in the following areas: regulation and competition, 
innovation, regional economy and industrial politics and health economics.   
Research results are disseminated through publications, conferences and colloquia. 
These activities are aimed to foster cooperation between the private sector and public 
administrations, as well as the exchange of ideas and initiatives.  
The sponsors of the SP-SP Center are the following:  
  Accenture 
  Ajuntament de Barcelona 
  Departament d’ Economia i Coneixement de la Generalitat de Catalunya 
  Departament d’ Empresa i Ocupació de la Generalitat de Catalunya 
  Diputació de Barcelona 
  Endesa 
  FOBSIC 
  Fundació AGBAR 
  Institut Català de les Indústries Culturals 
  Mediapro 
  Sanofi Aventis 
  ATM, FGC y TMB 
The contents of this publication reflect the conclusions and findings of the individual 













This paper presents a market with asymmetric information where a privately revealing 
equilibrium obtains in a competitive framework and where incentives to acquire 
information are preserved. The equilibrium is efficient, and the paradoxes associated with 
fully revealing rational expectations equilibria are precluded without resorting to noise 
traders. The rate at which equilibria in finite replica markets with n traders approach the 
equilibrium in the continuum economy is 1 n , slower than the rate of convergence to 
price-taking behavior (1 n); and the per capita welfare loss is dissipated at the rate 1 n, 
slower than the rate at which inefficiency due to market power vanishes (
2 1 n ). The 
model admits a reinterpretation in which behavioral traders coexist with rational traders, 
and it allows us to characterize the amount of induced mispricing. 
 
Keywords: adverse selection, information acquisition, double auction, multi-unit 
auctions, rate of convergence, behavioral traders, complementarities 
 
                                                 
*  I am grateful to Rodrigo Escudero and Vahe Sahakyan for excellent research assistance. The research 
in this paper is part of the project “Information and Competition”, European Advanced Grant (no. 
230254) of the European Research Council. Complementary support from project ECO2008-05155 of 
the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science at the Public-Private Sector Research Center at IESE is 
acknowledged.   2
1. Introduction 
Rational expectations models have proved to be a workhorse for the analysis of situations 
involving uncertainty and private information. An important aim has been to provide a 
workable model of Hayek’s (1945) idea that prices aggregate the dispersed information 
of agents in the economy, given agents’ dual role as index of scarcity and conveyors of 
information. However, the concept of a rational expectations equilibrium (REE) is not 
without problems—and this is especially true of fully revealing REE in competitive 
markets. The concept has two main difficulties. First, the equilibrium need not be 
implementable; that is, it may not be possible to find a trading mechanism (in a well-
specified game) that delivers the fully revealing REE. Second, if information is costly to 
acquire, then agents at a fully revealing REE will have no incentive to purchase 
information and so the equilibrium breaks down (this is the “paradox of informationally 
efficient markets”; see Grossman and Stiglitz 1980). An added problem arises if the 
competitive REE is defined in a finite-agent economy, since then traders realize that 
prices convey information but do not realize the impact of their actions on the price (this 
is the “schizophrenia” problem of Hellwig 1980). These problems are typically overcome 
by considering noisy REE in large economies. Indeed, noise traders in competitive 
models have prevented trade from collapsing.1 
 
This paper presents a simple, competitive, large-market model without noise traders and 
in which the valuation of each trader has a common and a private value component. It 
shows how to obtain a privately revealing equilibrium in a well-specified game where 
each trader submits a demand schedule and has incentives to rely on his private signal 
and on the price. In a privately revealing equilibrium the price and the private signal of a 
trader are sufficient statistics for the trader in the market. The equilibrium is efficient, 
preserves incentives to acquire information, and overcomes the problems of fully 
revealing REE without reliance on noise trading. Furthermore, the Bayesian equilibrium 
in demand schedules obtained in the large market is not an artifact of the continuum 
specification for traders. We verify that the large limit market well approximates large 
finite markets in which traders are strategic and have incentives to influence prices, thus 
                                                 
1  See, for example, Diamond and Verrecchia (1981) and Admati (1985).   3
providing a foundation for REE with rational traders in the context of the model 
presented. In addition, the model admits a reinterpretation in which behavioral traders 
coexist with rational traders (under an approach similar to that of Serrano-Padial 2010). 
 
The model is of the linear-normal variety, as in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), and it 
assumes declining marginal valuations. It is quite tractable and allows us to address the 
case of a good with exogenous supply as well as the case of a double auction; in addition, 
it enables us to characterize explicitly not only information acquisition but also rates of 
convergence of finite markets to the continuum limit. The model admits interpretation in 
terms of both financial markets and markets for goods. 
 
We find that there is a unique linear equilibrium that is privately revealing and efficient. 
In equilibrium, a high price indicates a high valuation, and this reduces responsiveness to 
price when there is private information. Indeed, demand schedules in this case are steeper 
and there is a greater extent of adverse selection in the market (which increases with the 
correlation of valuations and the noise in the signals). If the information effect is large 
enough, demand schedules may be upward sloping. Demand becomes steeper also as the 
slope of marginal valuation is steeper and as the slope of exogenous supply is flatter. The 
second of these observations can be reinterpreted as an inverse measure of the mass of 
“value” behavioral traders in a double auction market. Then we find that the demand of 
rational traders is upward sloping for a large enough mass of behavioral traders and also 
that the amount of mispricing increases with this mass. The case of a downward-sloping 
exogenous supply of the good allows us to capture complementarities among the agents 
in the market, makes aggregate excess demand upward sloping, and can be interpreted in 
terms of the presence of “momentum” or “positive-feedback” behavioral traders. 
Mispricing is then more severe than with value behavioral traders, and it increases as 
rational traders increase relative to momentum traders. Rational traders benefit more from 
the presence of momentum traders than from that of value traders. 
 
If the signals are costly to acquire and if traders face a convex cost of acquiring precision, 
then there is an upper bound on the correlation of valuation parameters below which there   4
are incentives to purchase some precision. This upper bound is decreasing in the 
precision of the prior and in the marginal cost of acquiring precision; this bound is 1—
that is, perfect correlation—when the marginal cost (at zero precision) of acquiring 
precision is zero or when the prior is diffuse. A more diffuse prior or less correlation 
among valuations induces more efforts to acquire information. The rate at which 
equilibria in finite replica markets (with n traders and corresponding exogenous supply) 
approach the equilibrium in the continuum economy is 1 n , the same rate at which the 
average signal of the traders tends to the limit average valuation parameter. Convergence 
accelerates as we approach a common value environment with better signals or with less 
prior uncertainty. The corresponding (per capita) welfare loss in the finite market with 
respect to the limit market is of the order of 1 n, and again convergence is faster when 
closer to the common value case or when there is less prior uncertainty. However, the 
effect of noise in the signals is ambiguous here because it has opposing effects on 
allocative and distributive efficiency. The rate of convergence of prices, 1 n , is slower 
than the rate of convergence to price-taking behavior, 1 n , with a corresponding 
dissipation rate of the (per capita) welfare loss due to market power, 
2 1 n . 
 
The model developed here can be applied to explaining how banks bid for liquidity in 
central bank auctions (or how bidders behave in Treasury auctions) and to assessing the 
effect of pollution damages on market outcomes. In particular, the model can be used to 
simulate the impact of a financial crisis on central bank liquidity auctions. 
 
This paper is related to at least four strands of the literature. First, it is related to work on 
information aggregation, and on the foundations of REE in auction games, that developed 
from the pioneering studies of Wilson (1977) and Milgrom (1981) and have more 
recently been extended by Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997). The convergence to price 
taking and to efficiency as double auction markets grow large has been analyzed in 
Wilson (1985), Satterthwaite and Williams (1989), and Rustichini, Satterthwaite, and 
Williams (1994). Along these lines, Cripps and Swinkels (2006) also allow private and 
common value components of uncertainty. Our results on the model’s double auction   5
version are more closely related to Reny and Perry (2006), who present a double auction 
model with a unique and privately revealing REE that is implementable as a Bayesian 
equilibrium in symmetric increasing bidding strategies; they also offer an approximation 
in a finite large market. Given the nature of our own model, the results presented here 
deal with multi-unit demands and enable characterizations of an equilibrium’s 
comparative static properties and of information acquisition. Furthermore, the model 
allows us to study convergence rates and to analyze the effect of an exogenous supply of 
the good. 
 
Second, a parallel literature on information aggregation has developed in the context of 
Cournot markets (Palfrey 1985; Vives 1988). Third, the literature on strategic 
competition in terms of schedules in uniform price auctions has developed from the 
seminal work of Wilson (1979) and Kyle (1989) (see also Wang and Zender 2002). Vives 
(2011a,b) considers strategic supply competition and provides a finite-trader counterpart 
to the model in this paper. Consistently with the analysis in double auction settings, we 
find that price taking obtains at a rate of 1 n whereas efficiency is achieved at the rate 
2 1 n  (where n is the number of traders).2 
 
Finally, the fourth strand to which this paper is related is the growing literature on 
behavioral models (e.g., De Long et al. 1990; Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam 
1998; Hong and Stein 1999; Serrano-Padial 2010). This connection will be emphasized 
throughout our discussion. 
 
The balance of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 
summarizes the problems with the concept of a fully revealing REE and introduces our 
approach. Section 4 characterizes the equilibrium and its properties; Section 5 presents 
some extensions of the model. Section 6 deals with information acquisition, and Section 
7 considers large but finite markets. Finally, the Appendix gathers some of the proofs. 
 
                                                 
2  See Rostek and Weretka (2010) for an asymmetric correlation structure for valuation parameters.   6
2. The model 
A continuum of traders—indexed in the unit interval    0,1 i , which is endowed with the 
Lebesgue measure—face a linear, downward-sloping inverse supply for a homogenous 
good  p x    . Here  ,0     and  x    denotes aggregate quantity in our continuum 
economy (and also per capita quantity, since we have normalized the measure of traders 
to 1). We have 
1
0 i x xd i   , where  i x  is the individual quantity demanded by trader i. We 
interpret 0 i x   to mean that the trader is a (net) supplier. 
 




ii i i p xx

   , 
where  i   is a value private to the trader and  i x   is a marginal transaction or opportunity 
cost (it could also be interpreted as a proxy for risk aversion). 
 
We assume that  i    is normally distributed (with mean     and  variance
2
  ). The 
parameters  i   and  j  ,  j i  , are correlated with correlation coefficient    0,1   . We 
therefore have 
2 cov , ij         for  j i  . Trader i   receives a signal  iii s   ; all 
signals are of the same precision, and  i  is normally distributed with    0 i E    and 
 
2 var i     . Error terms in the signals are correlated neither with themselves nor with 
the  i   parameters. 
 
Our information structure encompasses the case of a common value and also that of 
private values. If  1   , the valuation parameters are perfectly correlated and we are in a 
common value model. When 01   , we are in a private values model if signals are 
perfect and 
2 0     for all i; traders receive idiosyncratic, imperfectly correlated shocks, 
and each trader observes her shock with no measurement error. If  0   , then the   7
parameters are independent and we are in an independent values model. Under our 
assumption of normality, conditional expectations are affine.
3 
 
Let the average valuation parameter be  j dj  
 , normally distributed with mean   
and 
2 cov , var i            
 .4 An equivalent formulation that highlights the aggregate 
and idiosyncratic components of uncertainty is to let  ii        and observe that 
ii     , where cov , 0 i    
  and cov , 0 ij      for ij  . We adopt the convention 
that the average of independent and identically distributed random variables with mean 
zero is zero.
5 We then have  iii s s di di di     
   almost surely, since 0 i di     
according to our convention. Note that if  0    then     (a.s.). 
 
3. Rational expectations equilibria and the schedule game 
In this section we begin by defining REE and expounding on its problems. We then move 
on to our game-theoretic approach and interpretations of the model. 
 
3.1. Rational expectations equilibrium 
A (competitive) rational expectations equilibrium is a (measurable) price function 
mapping the average valuation (state of the world)    into prices   P    and a set of trades 
  , 0,1 i xi  , such that the following two statements hold. 
                                                 
3  With normal distributions there is positive probability that prices and quantities are negative in 
equilibrium. We can control for this if necessary by restricting the variances of the distributions and of 
the parameters  ,  ,  , and  . 
4  This can be justified as the continuum analogue of the finite case with n  traders. Then, under our 
assumptions, the average parameter 
n     is normally distributed with mean  , 
   
21 var 1 1
n nn
  
   , and      cov , var
ni n     . The result is obtained by letting n  tend to 
infinity. 
5  See Vives (1988) for a justification of this convention. In any event, we will see that the equilibrium in 
the continuum economy is the limit of equilibria in the appropriate finite economies under the standard 
laws of large numbers.   8
(1) Trader  i maximizes its expected profit,  , ii Es p      , conditional on knowing the 
functional relationship        as well as the underlying distributions of the 
random variables. 
(2) Markets  clear:   
1 1
0  0 i Zp x d i p 
    . 
Thus each trader optimizes while taking prices as given, as in the usual competitive 
equilibrium, but infers from prices the relevant information. 
 
This equilibrium concept is problematic. Consider the common value case ( 1   ); we 
shall present a fully revealing REE that is not, however, implementable. Suppose there is 
a competitive equilibrium of a full information market in which the traders know  . At 
this equilibrium, price equals marginal benefit,  i p x     ; therefore, individual demand 
is  
1
i x p 
  . The equilibrium price is given by the market-clearing condition 
0 Zp   and is equal to      p      . This allocation is also a fully 
revealing REE of our economy (Grossman 1981). Indeed, looking at the price allows 
each trader to learn  , which is the only relevant uncertainty, and the allocation is a REE 
equilibrium because firms optimize and markets clear. However, this REE has a strange 
property: the price is fully revealing even though a trader’s demand is independent of the 
signals received. How has the information been incorporated into the price? In other 
words, what is the game and the market microstructure that yields such a result? In this 
case we cannot find a game that delivers as an equilibrium the fully revealing REE.
6 
 
3.2. The schedule game 
We will restrict our attention to REE that are the outcome of a well-specified game—that 
is, implementable REE. The natural way to implement competitive REE in our context is 
                                                 
6  If we were to insist that prices be measurable in excess demand functions, then the fully revealing REE 
would not exist (see Beja 1977; Anderson and Sonnenschein 1982). However, fully revealing REE are 
implementable if each agent is informationally “small” or irrelevant in the sense that his private 
information can be predicted from the joint information of other agents (Palfrey and Srivastava 1986; 
Postlewaite and Schmeidler 1986; Blume and Easley 1990).   9
to consider competition among demand functions (see Wilson 1979; Kyle 1989) in a 
market where each trader is negligible.7 
 
We assume that traders compete in terms of their demand functions for the exogenous 
supply of the good. The game’s timing is as follows. At  0 t  , random variables   0,1 i i 
  
are drawn but not observed. At  1 t  , traders observe their own private signals,   0,1 i i s
 , 
and submit demand functions    , ii X s   with    , ii i x Xsp  , where  p  is the market price. 
The strategy of a trader is therefore a map from the signal space to the space of demand 
functions. At  2 t   the market clears, demands are aggregated and crossed with supply to 
obtain an equilibrium price,
8  and payoffs are collected. An implementable REE is 
associated with a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game in demand functions. Hereafter 
we discuss only the linear Bayesian demand function equilibrium (DFE). 
 
3.3. Interpretations of the model 
The model and game admit several interpretations in terms of financial markets and 
markets for goods as long as there are enough participants to justify the use of the 
continuum model assumption (this issue is dealt formally with in Section 7). 
 
The good may be a financial asset such as central bank funds or Treasury notes, and the 
traders are the bidders (banks and other intermediaries) in the auction who use demand 
functions. In the open-market operation of central bank funds, the average valuation    is 
related to the price (interest rate) in the secondary interbank market and   may reflect 
the structure of a counterparty’s pool of collateral. A bidder bank must offer the central 
bank collateral in exchange for funds, and the bidder’s first preference is to offer the least 
liquid one. Given an increased allotment of funds, the bank must offer more liquid types 
of collateral at a higher opportunity cost; this implies a declining marginal valuation for 
                                                 
7  See Gul and Postlewaite (1992) and Mas-Colell and Vives (1993) for results on the implementation of 
efficient allocations in large economies. 
8  If there is no market-clearing price then assume that the market closes; if there are many market-
clearing prices, choose the one that maximizes volume.   10
the bidder.9  The marginal value for funds of bank i  has the idiosyncratic component 
ii     , which is uncorrelated with the like component of other banks. Bank i 
receives an imperfect signal about its overall valuation  i  . In a Treasury auction, bidders 
will have private information related to different expectations about the future resale 
value     of the securities (e.g., different beliefs concerning how future inflation will 
affect securities denominated in nominal terms) and to the idiosyncratic liquidity needs of 
traders.10 We should expect that the common value component is more significant in 
Treasury auctions than in central bank auctions, since the main dealers buy Treasury bills 
primarily for resale.11 
 
The good could also be an input (such as labor of uncertain productivity) whose traders 
are the firms that want to purchase it. Our model also accommodates the case where firms 
compete in supply functions to fill an exogenous demand, as in procurement auctions. In 
this case we assume that    , since  i   is now a cost parameter and typically  0 i x  . 
For example,  i   could be a unit ex post pollution or emission penalty to be levied on the 
firm and about which the producer has some private information. 
 
4. Bayesian demand function equilibrium 
In this section we use Proposition 1 to characterize the symmetric
12 equilibrium of the 
demand schedule game before discussing its properties. We then extend the range of the 
model to double auctions and inelastic supply, market structures with complementarities, 
and behavioral traders. 
                                                 
9  See Ewerhart, Cassola, and Valla (2010). 
10  For example, Hortaçsu and Kastl (2008) cannot reject the hypothesis that bidders in Canadian 3-month 
T-bill auctions have private values. 
11  See Bindseil, Nyborg, and Strebulaev (2005). 
12  The symmetry requirement could be relaxed. Then the (linear and symmetric) equilibrium would be 
unique in the class of (linear) equilibria with uniformly bounded second moments (equivalently, in the 
class of equilibria with linear price functional of the type   P   ).   11
Proposition 1.  Let   0,1    and 
22
    .  Then there is a unique symmetric DFE 
given by 
  
1 ,, ii i i X sp E sp p ba s c p 
       . 
Here 
   
11
,1 , 1 ,
1





     

 
and   
22 1 M      .  Moreover,  0 a   and 
11 ca  
     .  Also,  c  is 
decreasing in M and   and is increasing in  ;   
1 0 Z' c 
    ; and the equilibrium 









Proof: See the Appendix. 
 
It is worthwhile to highlight some properties of this equilibrium. 
 
The equilibrium is, first of all, privately revealing.13 The price  p  reveals the average 
parameter    and, for trader i, either pair   , i sp or   , i s    is a sufficient statistic for the 
joint information in the market. In particular, at equilibrium we have 
,, ii ii Es pEs       
 . The privately revealing character of the equilibrium implies 
that the incentives to acquire information are preserved. 
 
Second, the equilibrium is efficient: it is a price-taking equilibrium, the price reveals   , 
and firms act with a sufficient statistic for the shared information in the economy.14 
Indeed, at equilibrium we have that price equals marginal benefit with full (shared) 
                                                 
13  See Allen (1981). 
14  A fully revealing REE must be ex post Pareto optimal. The reason is that it can be viewed as the 
competitive equilibrium of an economy with fully informed agents and so, according to the first 
welfare theorem, it cannot be improved on by a social planner with access to the pooled information of 
agents (Grossman 1981).   12
information:  , ii i p Es x     
 . This would not be the case if traders had market 
power, since then a wedge would be introduced between price and marginal benefit (see 
Vives 2011a). Neither would the equilibrium be efficient if price were noisy, since then a 
trader would not take into account the information externality that her trade has on other 
traders through the effect on the informativeness of the price (see, e.g., Amador and Weill 
2010; Vives 2011c). 
 
In the common value case, the equilibrium breaks down. If  1    (and
2 0     ) then, 
as stated in Section 3, there is a fully revealing REE but it is not implementable (indeed, a 
linear equilibrium does not exist). 
 
When signals are perfect (
2 0     and    
1 22 10 M   

  ), we have that 
1 ac
  ,  0 b  , and  
1
ii x p 
  . Bidders have nothing to learn from prices, and 
the equilibrium is just the usual complete information competitive equilibrium (which, 
we remark, is independent of  ). When  0 M  , bidders learn from prices and the 
demand functions are steeper: 
1 c 
  . Indeed, the larger is M  (which is increasing in   
and in 
22
     and can be viewed as an index of adverse selection), the more the price 
serves to inform about the common value component and the steeper are the demand 
functions (lower c). The response to a price increase is to reduce the amount demanded 
according to the usual scarcity effect, but this impulse is moderated (or even reversed) by 
an information effect because a high price conveys the good news that the average 
valuation is high. Indeed, if 
1 M 
   then  0 c  ; for larger values of M , we have 
0 c   and demand is upward sloping.15 As  M  we have that  0 a  , b    , 
and  1 c   . Then the linear equilibrium collapses because, in the limit, traders put no 
weight on their private signals. We have already seen that when  1    (and
2 0     ) 
there is a fully revealing REE that is not implementable. When signals are pure noise 
                                                 
15  C. Wilson (1980) finds an upward-sloping demand schedule in a market with asymmetric information 
whose quality is known only to the sellers.   13
(
2
   ), the equilibrium is     
1 X pp 
    because  , ii Es p       (even  if 
1   ). However, this equilibrium is not the limit of DFE as 
2
   (M ). 
 
If 0     then the price conveys no information on values, 
1 c 
  , and 
 
1 , ii i X sp E s p 
     . Again this is not the limit of DFE as 0   . However, it 
can be checked that there is no discontinuity in outcomes. 
 
5. Extensions 
In this section we extend the model to some boundary cases and new interpretations: 
inelastic supply and double auctions, complementarities, and behavioral traders. 
 
5.1. Inelastic supply and double auctions 
The case in which an auctioneer supplies q units of the good is easily accommodated by 
letting   and  q  . From the inverse supply function we obtain the average 
quantity  y pq    ; then ca   and    1 ba q   . Here demand is always 
downward sloping, and the strategy of a trader is      , ii X sp ba s p    and  p q     . 
The good can be in zero net supply ( 0 q  ) as in a double auction, in which case  0 b   
and p    .16 A trader is a buyer or a seller depending on whether her private signal is 
larger or smaller than the price. 
 
Reny and Perry (2006) obtain a related result in a double auction with a unit mass of 
traders, each of whom desires at most one unit of the good. Each trader receives a 
conditionally independent signal about the random value of the good. The value of the 
good and the signals of the agents are assumed to be strictly affiliated (and the densities 
of the random variables are smooth and positive on the unit interval). It is assumed also 
that the valuation of a trader is (strictly) increasing in his signal and (weakly) increasing 
in the good’s value. In contrast to our model, in Reny and Perry’s model there is a 
                                                 
16   In this case there is also a no-trade equilibrium.   14
common value for the good but the payoff of a trader depends directly on the signal he 
receives. This signal provides a private value component to the trader’s valuation. 
 
Once traders have received their signals, they submit bids to the auctioneer. A buyer 
(resp., seller) indicates the maximum (minimum) price she is willing to pay for (resp., for 
which he is willing to sell) the desired unit. The auctioneer then uses the bids to form 
supply and demand schedules and finds a market-clearing price. Buyers whose bids are 
above the market-clearing price obtain one unit, and those with bids below the market-
clearing price come away with nothing. 
 
Unlike the case for our DFE, traders in a double action cannot condition on the market 
price because they submit a single bid that is contingent only on private information. 
Nonetheless, there is a unique (and privately revealing) REE that is implementable as a 
Bayesian equilibrium of the double auction in symmetric increasing bidding strategies. 
The equilibrium is privately revealing because the price reveals the value of the good and 
this, together with the signal received by a trader, determines his payoff. The equilibrium 
is efficient because the privately revealing REE is just the competitive equilibrium when 
the state is known. This REE is implementable as a double auction even in a pure 
common value case (when the valuation of a trader is independent of his signal), in 
contrast to the demand competition model, owing to the double auction mechanism 
whereby bids are for a single unit. At the REE both buyers and sellers are indifferent 
between using (or not) their private signal, so they might as well use it. 
 
Reny and Perry (2006) also provide a strategic foundation for the rational expectations 
equilibrium in a finite-market counterpart of the double auction continuum model. This 
issue is addressed in Section 7.2 to follow. 
 
5.2. Complementarities 
Letting 0    allows for complementarities. For example, if traders are suppliers ( 0 i x  ) 
then  0     means that increasing the aggregate quantity leads to price increases, a 
dynamic typical of network goods; conversely, if traders are demanders ( 0 i x  ) then   15
0    means that increasing the aggregate quantity lowers the price, as may occur with 
labor supply when the income effect dominates. We can allow negative values of   
with 0      . The last inequality ensures that    0 Ep   in equilibrium and 
implies that  0    (since  0   ). When  0    we have that
1 ca 
   and that 
c increases in M; in other words, the exogenous supply is downward sloping and an 
increase in M  makes demand flatter. Furthermore, excess demand is upward sloping: 

1 0 Zc 
     . Now the information and the scarcity effect work in the same 
direction, and a high price conveys the unequivocal bad news that the average valuation 
is low. 
 
5.3. Behavioral traders in a double auction 
Consider a double auction—say, with zero net supply ( 0 q  ), equilibrium 




 boundedly rational 
traders who supply the good according to the fixed schedule    yp    . We shall 
interpret  0    as meaning that “value” traders predominate and  0    as meaning that 
“momentum” or “positive-feedback” traders dominate. Value traders sell when the price 
is high, whereas momentum traders sell when it is low.17 We are in the context of our 
model (provided that  0   ), Proposition 1 applies, and rational traders adjust by 
using the strategy   , ii X sp ba s c p    with ca   if  0    and ca   if  0   . That is, 
rational traders use a steeper demand schedule with value traders and a flatter one with 
momentum traders. Note that demand will be upward sloping ( 0 c  ) for a large enough 
mass of value behavioral traders (i.e., when  M    ). 
 
The presence of behavioral traders makes total excess demand flatter (i.e., 

1 11 1 1 Zc M  




), and with momentum traders 
                                                 
17  See Hirshleifer (2001) for a survey of behavioral biases in asset pricing; see Asness, Moskowitz, and 
Pedersen (2009) for an empirical analysis of the returns to value and momentum trading.   16
( 0   ) the excess demand slopes upward ( 0 Z  ). Since    
2 1 var 1 var p 
      
  
and since  0   , it follows that price volatility increases with   and  therefore 
decreases with the mass of behavioral traders. It can be checked that expected profits of 
rational traders are always larger with behavioral traders and that they decrease with .18 
These profits are minimal when    and there are no behavioral traders, and they are 
maximal when    . This means that expected profits increase with the mass of 




, when value traders predominate and decrease with the mass of 
behavioral traders when momentum traders predominate. Expected profits are higher 
when  0   , so rational traders would prefer to have momentum traders around. 
 








which is decreasing in   . In words: when value trading predominates ( 0   ), the 
mispricing is increasing in its mass, 
1 
 ; when momentum trading predominates ( 0   ), 





. De Long et al. (1990) also find that increasing the proportion of rational 
traders relative to positive-feedback traders may increase the amount of mispricing. An 
alternative measure of mispricing is   
2 1 var 1 var p   
         
 , from which we 
conclude that mispricing is increasing in   and in 
2
  . This finding is consistent with 
behavioral models in which greater uncertainty and more adverse selection (in our model, 
increasing in ) increase misvaluation (see, e.g., Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam 
1998; Hong and Stein 1999). 
 
Serrano-Padial (2010) studies a pure common value double auction with a continuum of 
traders, a fraction of whom are naïve (in the sense that they use a fixed bidding strategy 
                                                 
18  See the expression for expected profits in the proof of Proposition 2.   17
independent of what other traders do). In his model, nonnegligible amounts of naïve trade 
are compatible with fully revealing prices. 
 
6. Information acquisition 
Now suppose that, in a first stage of the game, private signals must be purchased at a 
cost, which is increasing and convex in the precision 
2 1      of the signal,19 according 
to a smooth function   H   that satisfies    00 H   with  0 H   for  0    , and  0 H . 
Hence there are nonincreasing returns to information acquisition. At a second stage, 
traders receive signals according to the precision purchased and compete in demand 
functions. The following result summarizes our analysis of symmetric equilibria of the 
two-stage game. 
 
Proposition 2. Let    0,1   . There is a unique symmetric equilibrium in the two-stage 
game with costly information acquisition where 
* 0     if   
1 2 20 H  

   and 
* 0     if 
 120 H       , in which case
*
   is decreasing in  ,    , and   . Otherwise 
there is no equilibrium. 
 
Proof: Suppose that, at the first stage, all traders but i have chosen a precision  0    . 
Then the market equilibrium (which is unaffected by the actions of a single trader) 
exhibits, according to Proposition 1, the price      p       , a price that 
reveals   . Trader i receives a signal with precision 




ii i i Es p x x

   
 , 
which yields the first-order condition  , ii i Es px     






    , where   , ii i xEs p     
  and    p       . Note that 
                                                 
19  For a random variable  , we use 
   to denote 
2 1
  .   18
  i E    does not depend on      because the equilibrium reveals   . We remark that 
 ,1 ii i i i Es s        
















    and      
2
2 var ii i Ex Ex x             
with    () / () i Ex      and 
    
    
2
2
2 21 1 2 1
11 var var 1
11 1.
i




     
 
      
 
 
           
       

 
We can use this fact to obtain 












           

     
               

. 
















Observe that this marginal benefit is decreasing in 
i    provided  that  1    (and  thus  
  i E   is strictly concave in 
i   ). Let 











Then  0    and  0  . We have that   
1 22 (0) (1 ) 2 (0) 0 H    

     if and only 
if  120 H       , in which case there is a unique interior solution 
*
   to the 
equation  0    . Note that 
*
   is decreasing in  ,    , and   because   is. 
 














   19
when no trader other than i purchases information (the price then is 
  p       and the expression for   
i i E       is the same as when 0   ), 
it follows that  0     is an equilibrium only if     
1 2 02 0 0 H   

   . Otherwise 
(i.e., if  
1 2 20 H  

  ), it will benefit a single trader to purchase information and 
there is no symmetric equilibrium in the game. (In fact, we can show that neither is there 
an asymmetric equilibrium in the class of trading strategies with bounded second 
moments.)  
 
A more diffuse prior or less correlation of valuations induces more acquisition of 
information. In particular, when  1    an equilibrium exists if    00 H   or if the prior is 
diffuse (    small). As      we have 
* 0    , and the demand function equilibrium 
collapses. 
 
It is worth remarking that the same equilibrium would obtain in a one-shot game where 
traders choose simultaneously the demand function and the precision of the signal. This 
corresponds to the case where information acquisition is covert (nonobservable). The 
equivalence of the games follows from the existence of a continuum of traders. 
 
Hence we see that the incentives to acquire information are preserved because the 
equilibrium is privately revealing—as long as we are not too close to the common value 
case, or otherwise the marginal cost of acquiring information at zero precision is zero 
(and  1   ). Jackson (1991) shows the possibility of fully revealing prices in a common 
value environment with costly information acquisition (and under some specific 
parametric assumptions) when there is a finite number of agents. 
 
Application. Consider the example of banks bidding for liquidity and the impact of a 
crisis. In this scenario we may expect that the correlation  of the values of the banks 
increases (equivalently, that the volatility of the price    in the secondary market for 
liquidity increases) and that   also increases as it becomes more costly to supply more   20
liquid collateral. The direct effect of an increase in   or     is to make the demand 
schedules of the banks steeper (Proposition 1), and this effect is reinforced by the induced 
decrease in information precision (
*
   goes down, according to Proposition 2). The effect 
of the crisis is thus that demand schedules are steeper and the signals noisier. These 
effects are consistent with the empirical evidence gathered by Cassola, Hortaçsu, and 
Kastl (2009) when studying European Central Bank auctions. These authors find that the 
aggregate bid curve became steeper after the subprime crisis in August 2007.20 When our 
model is interpreted as representing behavioral traders, we find that such a crisis would 
increase mispricing because it is increasing in   and in  for 0   , when the value 
traders predominate. 
 
7. Finite markets and convergence to the limit equilibrium 
The question arises of whether the results obtained in the large market are simply an 
artifact of the continuum specification. In this section, we answer this question in the 
negative. We show that the equilibria in finite markets tend to the equilibrium of the 
continuum economy as the market grows large, which justifies our use of a continuum 
model to approximate the large market with demand function competition. We illustrate 
the argument with the double auction case. 
 
7.1. The convergence result 
Consider the following replica economy. Suppose that inverse supply is given by 

1
n Py y n 
  ; here  y  is total quantity and n is the number of traders (buyers), each 
with same benefit function as before. Increasing n will increase the number of buyers 
and increase the supply at the same rate. Denote with subscript n the magnitudes in the 
n -replica market. The information structure is the finite-trader counterpart of the 
structure described in Section 2. We have that 
                                                 
20   Market power leading  to bid shading may reinforce the steepness of the bid curve (see Vives (2011a)).   21
   
12
1  ,1 1
n
ni i nN n n    

       and cov , var ni n         
 . Note also that 

2  , n N          in mean square and that cov , var n         
  .21 
 
It follows from Proposition 1 in Vives (2011a) that, for    0,1   , there is a unique 
(symmetric) DFE of the form    , ni n n i n X sp b a s c p    for any n. The equilibrium is 
privately revealing, and the price reveals the average signal of the traders,  n s  . 
Furthermore, by Section S.4 in Vives (2011b), for   0,1     there is a symmetric 
equilibrium of the game with covert information acquisition in the n-replica market—
provided that the cost of information acquisition at zero precision is not too high. 
 
The following proposition establishes that, as n   grows large, the equilibria of finite 
markets converge to the limit equilibrium. Denote by ETS (resp., 
1ETSn n
 ) the per capita 
expected total surplus in the continuum (resp., in the n-replica markets). 
 
Proposition 3. Consider the n-replica market. 
 
(i) Let    0,1   . For given 
2 0    , the symmetric DFE of the n-replica market converge 
to the limit equilibrium as n tends to infinity: 
(a) 
n
n aa   , 
n
n cc   , and 
n
n bb   ; 
(b)  0
n





n nE p p


       
, 
where  
22 AV 1        if 0    and   
1 42 2 AV    

  if 0   ; 
(c) the per capita welfare loss 
1 WL ETS ETS 0
n
nn n
      at the rate 1 n, and the 
total welfare loss 
                                                 
21  See the Appendix for definitions of “in mean square” and of convergence (and rates of convergence) 



















(ii) Let    0,    , where  120 0 H      . Then the equilibrium 
* 0     of the 
continuum economy with endogenous information acquisition is the limit of the unique 
equilibrium  
* n    of the covert information acquisition game with replica markets for n 
large. 
 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
 
7.2. Illustration of the argument in the double auction case 
Consider the double auction case (with inelastic per capita supply ofq) to illustrate the 
argument for (a) and (b) in Proposition 3(i). 
 
Suppose that traders  j i   employ linear strategies,   jj X s, p b a s c p    . Then the 
market-clearing condition,    , ji jiX sp x n q
    ,  0 c  , implies that trader i faces a 
residual inverse supply: 
  
1
, where 1 and 1 ii i j
ji




        
  . 
The (endogenous) parameter d  is the slope of inverse residual supply and the wedge 
introduced by market power. All the information that the price provides to trader i about 
the signals of others is contained in the intercept  i I . The information available to trader i 




ii i ii i i ii i i i E s,p x E s,p p x x E s,p I d x x
 
               . 
The first-order condition (FOC) is    ii i Es , pp d x        . An equilibrium requires 
that  0 d  .22 
 
                                                 
22  The second-order sufficient condition is fulfilled when  0 d  .   23
A trader bids according to    ii i p Es , pd x        , and competitive bidding obtains 
when  0 d  . A buyer ( 0 i x  ) underbids,  ii i p Es , p x       ; since  0 d  , a seller 
(0 i x  ) overbids,  ii i p Es , p x       . 
 
From the FOC and the normal updating formulas for  ii Es , p      , we immediately obtain 
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     

 
    
   
for   
1
1 nn dn c

 . Now, in the finite economy (unlike the elastic exogenous supply 
case), we require  2 0 n nM   in order to guarantee the existence of an equilibrium 
(i.e., to obtain  0 n d   and  0 n c  ). (Observe that the inequality is always fulfilled for n 
large because  n M  is bounded.) The reason for this requirement is that, if the inequality 
does not hold, then traders will seek to exploit their market power by submitting vertical 
schedules, and that is incompatible with the existence of equilibrium when there is no 
elastic exogenous supply. 
 
The equilibrium price  n p   reveals the average signal  n s  ; therefore, 




iin nn i nE s , s E s 

           . Averaging the FOCs, we 
obtain that      n nnn nn Espd xd q        
   and  hence 
 nn n n p Es d q      
  . 
   24
We have that       ,1
n
ni i X sp a qa s p      , the trading strategy in the double 
auction in the limit economy.23 Furthermore, 
n
n p pq       in mean square at the 
rate 1 n . This follows because  0
n
n d    and 
n
n n Es      
   in mean square (given 
that 
n
n       and  0
n





n n nE E s         
  , where   
22 AV 1        if  0    and 

1 42 2 AV    

  if  0   . This means that the convergence is faster (in terms of 
asymptotic variance) the closer we are to the common value case, the less prior 
uncertainty there is, and the less noisy are the signals (if  0   ).24 The market power 
distortion   
1
1 nn dn c

  (i.e., the amount of over- or underbidding) is of the order 
1 n. 
 
Reny and Perry (2006) provide a strategic foundation for the Bayesian equilibrium/REE 
of the double auction in their continuum model. In a finite-market counterpart of their 
double auction continuum model, the authors use a symmetry-preserving rationing rule25 
to prove that, with enough buyers and sellers and with a sufficiently fine grid of prices, 
the following statement holds: generically in the valuation functions of the traders and the 
fineness of the grid, there is a Bayesian equilibrium in monotonically increasing bid 
functions that is very close to the unique REE of the continuum economy. The strategy of 
their involved proof is to show an appropriate continuity property for the equilibrium in 
the limit market. The main obstacle in the proof is that, with a finite number of traders,  
                                                 
23  This statement is proved as follows:  
1 1 1
n n caM 
      if  0    (since then 
n
n M M   ), 
and 
1
n n c 
    if  0    (since then  0
n M  ); furthermore, 
n







   . It can be checked similarly that    1
n
n ba q     . 
24 If  0    then     ; in this case, more noise in the signals makes    n n Es     closer to  , which 
speeds up convergence. See the Appendix for the definition of the asymptotic variance of convergence. 
25  In the double auction with a finite number of buyers and sellers, a rationing rule must be established 
for traders who bid exactly the market-clearing price.   25
in the double auction the strategies of buyers and sellers are not symmetric. 26   The 
incentives of buyers to underbid and of sellers to overbid in order to affect the price 
disappear as the market grows large and price-taking behavior obtains. In our DFE, the 
strategy of a trader is symmetric and the trader perceives that her influence on the price is 
given by  0 n d  . A buyer underbids and a seller overbids, and the incentives to 
manipulate the market also disappear as n grows and  0 n d  . We can in addition 
characterize the rate at which this happens (and at which convergence to the limit 
equilibrium obtains) and distinguish between the dissipation of market power and the 
averaging of noise terms. 
 
7.3. Summary and interpretation of results in the elastic supply case 
In a finite n -replica market, traders have the capacity to influence prices; the price 
reveals the average signal of the traders  n s  , which is a noisy estimate of  n   . We find that, 
for n large, such an equilibrium is close to the equilibrium in the limit economy where 
traders have no market power and where the price reveals the average parameter  . 
Convergence to the equilibrium of the continuum economy occurs as 1 n , the rate at 
which the average signal  n s   of the traders (or the average estimate  n n E s   
  ) tends to 
the average parameter     in the continuum economy. Convergence to price-taking 
behavior is faster (at the rate 1 n, since  n d  is of the order 1 n; see Proposition 7 in Vives 
2011a), but convergence to the limit is delayed by the slower convergence of the agents’ 
average signal. However, this latter convergence is faster (in terms of asymptotic 
variance) as we approach a common value environment (i.e., as  1   ), when there are 
better signals (low 
2
   for  0   ), and/or with less prior uncertainty (low 
2
  ). 
 
In the finite market, the per capita welfare loss (with respect to that in the limit market) is 
of the order of 1 n; see part (c) of Proposition 3(i). Here again, convergence is faster (in 
                                                 
26  The consequence is that the signal of each agent need not be affiliated with the order statistics of the 
bids of other agents. This failure of “single crossing” implies that standard proofs from auction theory, 
which rely on relationships between affiliation and order statistics with symmetric strategies, do not 
apply here.   26
terms of asymptotic variance) when closer to the common value case and slower if there 
is more prior uncertainty. The effect of noise in the signals is ambiguous if  0    since 
an increase in 
2
   will tend to raise allocative inefficiency while diminish distributive 
inefficiency. The reason is that the expression for total expected welfare loss in the finite 
market, 
     
22 WL 2 nn i n i nn E x xE u u               
(where  in in n uxx  
 and  ii ux x  ), has two components on the right-hand side; the first 
component reflects allocative inefficiency (is the average quantity at the right level?), and 
the second reflects distributive inefficiency (is a given average quantity efficiently 
distributed among market participants?). The first term converges to 

22 ((1 ) ) 2( )        if  0   , and the second term converges to 

24 2 2 (1 ) 2 ((1 ) )           as n . Increases in the correlation of parameters 




  will decrease both terms; however, the first 
term increases with 
2
   whereas the second term decreases with 
2
   (since more noise in 
the signals aligns more individual and average quantities).27  
 
The overall convergence result is again driven by the rate of information aggregation and 
not by the faster rate of convergence to price-taking behavior, which implies a welfare 
loss of the order of 
2 1 n  (cf. Proposition 7 in Vives 2011a). This latter result is consistent 
with results on the asymptotic dissipation of inefficiency that have been obtained in the 
double auction literature, which culminated in the work of Cripps and Swinkels (2006); 
these authors employed a generalized private value setting in which bidders can be 
asymmetric and can demand or supply multiple units. 
 
                                                 
27 W hen  0   , an increase in the noise of the signals reduces both terms.   27
Appendix 
 




ii i ii i Es p x Es p p x

         
which yields the FOC  , ii i p Es p x       . Positing linear strategies 
 , ii X sp ba s c p     while using the inverse supply function p x     and  our 
convention  i sd i   
, we obtain (provided that 1 0 c    ) an expression for the price 
 
1 1 p cb a    
     . The vector   ,, ii s      is normally distributed with 
    ii EEE s     














where        . It follows that   ,1 ii i Es s        
  for 
22 1 (1 / (1 ) )   














    
    
    
   
        
        
. 
Here    
1 1 Cc b  
    and    
1 1 Dc a  
  . If we use the projection theorem 

















     

        
. 
















   
      
     
    
 
 ; i ba s c p        28
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   
  
 
The solution to this system gives the result because for    0,1   , 
2 0    , and 
2
     
we have that   10 ca     , and 












































It is immediate that  0 a  , that 
11 ca  
     for  0   , and that c decreases in M 
and    but increases in  . Finally, we can use    
1 1 p cb a    
      together 
with the expressions for the equilibrium coefficients to show that 
  p        and      x        .  
 
Measures of speed of convergence. We say that the sequence (of real numbers)  n b  is of 
the order n
  (  a real number) whenever  n n nb k
     for some nonzero constant k .28 
The constant of convergence k  is a refined measure of the speed of convergence. We say 
that the sequence of random variables   n y  converges in mean square to zero at the rate 
1
r n (or that  n y  is of the order 1
r n ) if  
2
n Ey  
 converges to zero at the rate 1
r n 
                                                 
28   This definition is stronger than necessary but it will suffice for our purposes.   29
(i.e., if  
2
n Ey 
   is of the order 1
r n ). Given that      
2 2 var nnn Ey E y y    , a 
sequence   n y  such that    0 n Ey   and    var n y  is of order 1 n and converges to zero at 
the rate 1 n .  A more refined measure of the speed of convergence for a given 




n Ey      
at the rate 1
r n and    0 n Ey  . Then the asymptotic variance of convergence is given by 
the constant  
2 lim
r
n n nE y


   . A higher asymptotic variance means that the speed of 
convergence is slower. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: 



















  if  0    and 
1
n n c 





















nn dn n c 
       . Note that   
1 1 n
n nd c 
 
   , which is equal to 
 
1 111 M 
    if  0    or  to   
1 11 
    if  0   . Convergence for  n b  follows 
similarly. 
 
(i)(b) From Proposition 1 in Vives (2011a) we have that 
  nn n n x Es d        
  , where    
11
ni ni ii sn s n  
       , 
 1 nn n n n Es s       
  , and   
21 var var nn n n    
     
 . It follows that 

















          
  . Observe that  0
n
n d    and 
n
n n Es      
    in mean square (since 
n
n       and    0
n
i i n      in  mean 





















     





n n nE E s         
  , where   
22 AV 1        if  0    and 

1 42 2 AV    

 if  0   . We have that     x        , that 















          
  
 , and that both  n d  and 

2
n n EE s       




n nE x x        
 . Therefore,  0
n
n xx      in mean square. The results 
follow since   nn p px x     . 
 







x xd i x

          
   




















We can then write the expected welfare loss as 
       
22 1 WL TS TS 2 nn n i n i En E E x xE u u  
              , 
where  in in n uxx    and  ii ux x   (this follows as in the proof of Proposition 3 in Vives 




n nE x x         . 
We also know that     in n in n ut t d      and    ii ut     , where  nn n tE s    
   , 

        
2 22
22 2 2 22
1
11 1 1
n n in i i i
n
n
tE| s , s s s
 
   
 
      
  

       
     ,
 
and   ,1 ii i i tE s s         
























2 2 1 1
1
n
in i n i n
d








               
  .   31
Further computations yield 
      
2
12 2 2 2 12 ni n n n Es s d n d n d        
          
  . 
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



















(ii) Let    i E    be the expected profits of trader i   when the other traders j i   have 
information precision     and use identical strategies based on linear demand schedules 
with coefficients  ,, bac . Suppose that trader i  has  precision 
i    and  optimizes  his 
demand schedule. If we put    
1 1 1 n dn n c 
   , then it follows from Section S.4 in 
Vives (2011b) that 
 

    


















     
  

   
. 
Interior symmetric equilibria for information precision are characterized by the solution 
of   0 n H      , where  n d  is given by Proposition 1 in Vives (2011a) for any 
particular    . Let         
1 2
0 0l i m 2 20 nn n d
     

     and 
   0 0l i m nn dd
      . The existence condition for an interior symmetric equilibrium 
is   00 n H    . Note that    
1 2 02
n
n   

   because    00
n
n d    . Therefore, if 
   
1 2 2 01 2 0 0 H    

     (given  that    0,1 2 0 H        ), then 
 
1 2 20 0 H  

   and the condition      00 n H     is fulfilled for n large. Observe   32
that, since 0
n
















  . For n  large there is a 
unique symmetric equilibrium of the information acquisition game   
* n   , the solution to 
   '0 nn H      . This is easily checked because, for n  large,   n     is 
strictly decreasing in    . It follows that   
** 0 n     (where   
* 0    ) as n .  
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